Jump to content

Yamato- The Movie


Splash

Recommended Posts

I am a huge fan of war films so i think this one looks interesting. i will definetly keep a eye out for it.

chris

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Will they have a scene like this one?

PLX008340.jpg

They should have it at the same moment that the Yamato is in the middle of her suicide mission, getting blasted from all sides with no air cover.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I'm a big WWII Imperial Japan afficianado. So I really hope they do justice for the Yamato.

I'm still trying to figure out how they'll do the special effects. I haven't seen ANY of Yamato's escorts which really deserve to be seen. And I wonder if the USN planes will look good or not.(one shot in the trailer looks like a P-47, there were no USAF planes attacking Yamato.) Hellcats,Helldivers and Avengers only.

Yamato class BB's dwarfed all the world's other Battleships, I'm tired of hearing about Bismarck, it was a pipsqueak to the Yamato. Even the Iowa class BB's were considerably outweighed, by about 15,000 tons if I remember right.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Interesting, I wonder if they ever credited Yamato with any kills. The pity of it was that they never tried to actually take Pearl on December 7th. It would've being a truly bloody affair, but I can imagine the Yamato off the shores of Waikiki providing fire support for the imperial Japanese army.

I know the surface force did an OK job against a carrier escort group in the end of Leyte. But I recall the Yamato was forced away because of torpedoes from the escorting destroyer groups. So, the wet dream of battleships at gun range against carriers never really occurred.

In terms of battleships. The Yamato was no doubt the biggest, but there are many who will say that the Yamato was not the best ship of its time in spite of its gigantic 18 inch guns. The web site below is pretty interesting, the link refers to a comparison of the foremost battleships of the time.

http://www.combinedfleet.com/baddest.htm

They make a few interesting points, of course, a mano e mano fight like that one would've never occurred. By the time the U.S. rolled out the Jersey class BB, the U.S. Pacific fleet (i.e. the U.S. Navy) was a carrier oriented force. Before the battleships ever got into range of one another, the airplanes on both sides would've taken over.

Edited by kalvasflam
Link to comment
Share on other sites

I do recognize other Battleships had some advantages, especially in Radar and fire control. But there's something to be said for sheer armor and shell size.

It's ironic that Japan put such monumental resources, effort and prestige in the Yamato and Musashi and then failed to use them early in the war when it might have actually made a difference. (especially around Guadalcanal 1942, at night... :ph34r: )

(incidentally, Yamato entered service days after Pearl Harbor, but she certainly could have made her presence felt anywhere IF they'd actually risk useing her.)

Yamato and Iowa class share the same peculiar history, that is they never really got into big BB vs. BB surface engagements. Only Yamto's fight with escort carriers and Destroyers, and that's hardly what they expected Yamato to duel against. Iowa's served overwhelmingly as flak ships, and downed quite a few planes too but I don't think that's what they had in mind when they built them.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Interesting, I wonder if they ever credited Yamato with any kills.  The pity of it was that they never tried to actually take Pearl on December 7th.  It would've being a truly bloody affair, but I can imagine the Yamato off the shores of Waikiki providing fire support for the imperial Japanese army.

I know the surface force did an OK job against a carrier escort group in the end of Leyte.  But I recall the Yamato was forced away because of torpedoes from the escorting destroyer groups.  So, the wet dream of battleships at gun range against carriers never really occurred.

In terms of battleships.  The Yamato was no doubt the biggest, but there are many who will say that the Yamato was not the best ship of its time in spite of its gigantic 18 inch guns.  The web site below is pretty interesting, the link refers to a comparison of the foremost battleships of  the time.

http://www.combinedfleet.com/baddest.htm

They make a few interesting points, of course, a mano e mano fight like that one would've never occurred.  By the time the U.S. rolled out the Jersey class BB, the U.S. Pacific fleet (i.e. the U.S. Navy) was a carrier oriented force.  Before the battleships ever got into range of one another, the airplanes on both sides would've taken over.

347431[/snapback]

probaly not, Yamato was sadly more a monument than a warship to the japanese, which is sad since they had the best of the crew but have no battle experience during the war.

Hard to see how they can put a love story on a warship even on the "hotel yamato" unless it will be like letters to a love one on shore.

Edited by Zentrandude
Link to comment
Share on other sites

One reason I have some hope this movie could be good is they got Joe Hisaishi to compose the soundtrack. He did Mospeada back in the day and recently he did Kikujiro(?) and Spirited Away. As well TONS of other stuff.

Also, no they didn't have female crewmembers in WWII. They essentially had the same positioins as U.S. women at the time. (though Japanese women had considerably fewer rights in general) But they worked in factories, did clerical work,nursing etc.

The love story seems to be between a sailor and his gf on shore. Hope this movie isn't lame <_<

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Oh great. A story about some deck swabber on a doomed ship and some geisha girl cooking rice back home. This sounds so hot, I'm sure that movies like Mr. and Mrs. Smith will be blown away by the searing passion that exists in a story about a long-distance relationship...

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I know the surface force did an OK job against a carrier escort group in the end of Leyte.  But I recall the Yamato was forced away because of torpedoes from the escorting destroyer groups.  So, the wet dream of battleships at gun range against carriers never really occurred.

347431[/snapback]

The Japanese made a mess out of it. They had a speed advantage of over 10 knots but by ordering a 'General Attack' (each ship attacking any which way they wanted) and not doing a 'Beatty' (e.g. Damn the torpedoes, Full speed ahead!) they never really closed the range after THREE HOURS!!!!

It could have been a total massacre. 3 Battleships and escorting heavy cruisers against a force of destroyers and escort carriers...

Link to comment
Share on other sites

If not by that, by those damn big guns the Big Y carries. C'mon, you know we're in for the bang and the ships. Just put your mind in Pearl Harbor mode and let it go.

...

Damn, it really looks like a Pearl Harbor sequel.

347510[/snapback]

"I'll keep a part of you with me-and everywhere I go there you'll be........"

Link to comment
Share on other sites

The storyline will probably be along the lines of them first meeting after Leyte. Speaking about the evils of war. And something about duty and honor, and then he bids her a fond farewell as he goes off onto his suicide mission to Okinawa. She either sneaks on board and they die together (unlikely), or he survives the sinking and they end up reuniting after the war.

Either way, there will sure to be some pictures of those cowardly devil gaijin warmongers in their evil torpedo bombers racing in to sink the proud battleship Yamato, and her sister the Musashi.

Now to reality, yeah, the IJN made a mess of the actual operation. The surface force was supposed to be on a suicide mission, and they acted like they weren't on that mission at all. When a cruiser was damaged by torpedoes, they had destroyers escorting the sucker back home. Had they pressed home the attack, they would've wiped out at least two of the CVE groups and may be even got in sight of the landing area before Halsey came back and kicked their ass. But credit were it's due, the escort destroyers from the first CVE group sacrificed themselves and did their fair share of damage.

For those who are interested, the rest of that site is dedicated to the IJN, was quite comprehensive and very interesting.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

The Yamato was - for a machine dedicated to killing created by what was, essentially, a dictatorship - a very attractive ship (as Leeji Matusumoto well knew!).

My favourite fact about the Yamato is that the Japanese designed an anti-aircraft shell - for the eighteen inch guns! :o Imagine being some poor Dauntless pilot and beginning your attack, and seeing three of those monsters pointing at you! B)) (although by all accounts, the shell - a sort of incendiary shotgun affair - never really worked).

The other astonishing thing about the Yamato is that the Japanese were planning an even bigger "sequel" - with 21-inch guns...!

Edited by F-ZeroOne
Link to comment
Share on other sites

The Yamato was - for a machine dedicated to killing created by what was, essentially, a dictatorship - a very attractive ship (as Leeji Matusumoto well knew!).

My favourite fact about the Yamato is that the Japanese designed an anti-aircraft shell - for the eighteen inch guns!  :o Imagine being some poor Dauntless pilot and beginning your attack, and seeing three of those monsters pointing at you!  B)) (although by all accounts, the shell - a sort of incendiary shotgun affair - never really worked).

The other astonishing thing about the Yamato is that the Japanese were planning an even bigger "sequel" - with 21-inch guns...!

347709[/snapback]

I heard about those anti-air 18 inchers. Although I bet most pilots just laughed it off. It would've been a shot gun effect, and even in those days, the planes were packed that closely. That was what you'd call a desparation move when the IJN realized they could no longer match the Americans in the air.

The Japanese made several poor choices for all their brilliance. They were the first to see how useful aircraft carriers could be, yet they continue to botch things up with more battleships. Although in fairness, they did convert the third Yamato class, the Shinano. But that was sunk by a sub. Another area the IJN neglected. Where as the Germans failed to strangle England with U-boats, the Americans succeeded in strangling Japan.

A lot of this was cultural. It was not considered honorable to be on a destroyer hunting submarines. It was more honorable on a destroyer armed with long lances and going after cruisers. Although the former was more effective in a strategic sense since it would've saved a lot of their transport shipping.

The same thing with their pilots. The original pilots on the Kido Butai (Japanese carrier task force) were considered the best carrier pilots all around. They raped and pillaged their way through six months in the Pacific. But the IJN never really rotated their pilots, so the experience wasn't passed down well to new pilots. It wasn't honorable to be training newbies, more honorable to die in a glorious ball of fire burning and screaming. After a while, attrition killed off the best pilots in the IJN, and they were forced to send up inexperienced pilots to fight. All the while their American opponents rotated in and out training up new pilots, in the end, you get results like the great Marianas turkey shoot.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

  But the IJN never really rotated their pilots, so the experience wasn't passed down well to new pilots.  It wasn't honorable to be training newbies, more honorable to die in a glorious ball of fire burning and screaming. After a while, attrition killed off the best pilots in the IJN, and they were forced to send up inexperienced pilots to fight.  All the while their American opponents rotated in and out training up new pilots, in the end, you get results like the great Marianas turkey shoot.

347730[/snapback]

Theres some truth to that - although a few Japanese pilots had extraordinarly long careers, such as Saburo Sakai (who lived through China, the first years of the Pacific war, and the defence of the home islands; the latter part of his career flying with one eye...!) - but it should also be noted that Japanese aircraft were, in general, much more frail than most US or European aircraft (Zeroes, Oscars and Bettys being particularly notorious in this regard). Theres certainly a degree of callousness or "samurai spirit" to Japanese losses, but part of the reason Japanese aircraft were designed fragile was because Japanese industry had trouble developing (and perhaps more importantly, maintaining) reliable high-power engines; the Zero for example was on about 900hp when its comparable rivals were over 1000 or more (although at higher weights). It was a design trade-off that become more disadvantageous as the war went on.

Edited by F-ZeroOne
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Theres some truth to that - although a few Japanese pilots had extraordinarly long careers, such as Saburo Sakai (who lived through China, the first years of the Pacific war, and the defence of the home islands; the latter part of his career flying with one eye...!) - but it should also be noted that Japanese aircraft were, in general, much more frail than most US or European aircraft (Zeroes, Oscars and Bettys being particularly notorious in this regard). Theres certainly a degree of callousness or "samurai spirit" to Japanese losses, but part of the reason Japanese aircraft were designed fragile was because Japanese industry had trouble developing (and perhaps more importantly, maintaining) reliable high-power engines; the Zero for example was on about 900hp when its comparable rivals were over 1000 or more (although at higher weights). It was a design trade-off that become more disadvantageous as the war went on.

347749[/snapback]

Yep, also true, the Zero was for a time the most agile thing around, but it had a glass jaw. Hit it just once, and it'd burst into flames. The design tradeoff was great as long as the IJN had capable pilots. But they didn't because of their refusal to rotate experienced pilots back in to train rookies. The planes weren't designed to be survivable, no armor, no self sealing gas tanks, you name it. The zeroes usually didn't have it.

Also true is the fact that some of the experienced flyers did survive, who was the guy that led the Pearl attack? I think he lived throughout the war. Their skills were quite good, I think he and a few others actually managed to surprise some of the American carrier pilots over Honshu with their skills. Since the Americans had thought that by then all the Japanese pilots were rookies. But one super ace against fifty experienced flyers will still have the same result since the super ace wouldn't have an uber fighter.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

The 21 inch version of the Yamato would only pack 6 guns in 3 turrets and displace about the same weight though. Its not really bigger. Most people agree that 9 x 18 is still better then 6 x 21 though. Better chance of hitting and you don't pancake your exposed AAA guncrews and flatten your other exposed structures everytime you fire.

For the aircraft, as F-ZeroOne said, the Japanese were fighting with quite a disadvantage due to their lack of industrial power. They did a fantastic job going from fuedal armies to Kido Butai in just 50 years but their level of industrialisation was not yet equal to Germany, UK and the US yet. Which makes the effort needed for them to create Yamato even more staggering.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

For the aircraft, as F-ZeroOne said, the Japanese were fighting with quite a disadvantage due to their lack of industrial power. They did a fantastic job going from fuedal armies to Kido Butai in just 50 years but their level of industrialisation was not yet equal to Germany, UK and the US yet. Which makes the effort needed for them to create Yamato even more staggering.

347790[/snapback]

No doubt industry was the main reason for the Japan's downfall. But all these other factors didn't help much either. Rotating pilots could have helped with their attrition rate. Ultimately they still lose, but they could've made the war last longer.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Interesting, I wonder if they ever credited Yamato with any kills.  The pity of it was that they never tried to actually take Pearl on December 7th.

That was never the mission, and may have been beyond the ken of the Japanese at that point in the war. Remember, you have to look at Pearl in the wider context of the war. On December 7, not only did the Japanese attack Pearl Harbor (to knock out the US Pacific Fleet in the hopes of, if not bringing them to a negotiated settlement, at least giving the Japanese six months to a year of a free hand to consolidate their position), but they also attacked the Philippines, Wake Island, Singapore, Burma, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and were on their way to attacking Indonesia. The attack on Pearl was just one front in a wider breakout offensive by Japan on and around December 7.

And, speaking as an American, I'm darn glad they didn't try to take Pearl on December 7. It would have been an unmitigated disaster for us, as we were already reeling from the near destruction of great swathes of the fleet, and a similar destruction among the Army Air Forces installations. Although the troops in Hawaii would have put up a credible fight, and though there were still fighting ships available, the example of the Philippines seems to indicate that the Japanese, given a good assault force and enough security of their supply lines (which was the real probelm for them -- Hawaii is a good distance from Japan and the main Japanese supply bases and areas of operation, meaning a perilous sea journey for supplies that would have had to have gone to the operation, particularly if they had to pass by Midway, still in US hands) could have caused serious problems, and perhaps even defeated the garrison in Hawaii. Breifly put, On December 7, 1941, we were flat footed. In fact, in the actual event, about the only thing that saved Pearl Harbor NAS from a third wave and an even worse pasting (the third wave was to center on the fuel depots and repair yards) was that Adm. Nagumo had no idea where the US carrier force was (they had been sent out on manuvers days before December 7) and feared they were looking for him.

They make a few interesting points, of course, a mano e mano fight like that one would've never occurred.  By the time the U.S. rolled out the Jersey class BB, the U.S. Pacific fleet (i.e. the U.S. Navy) was a carrier oriented force.  Before the battleships ever got into range of one another, the airplanes on both sides would've taken over.

Even before then, the handwriting was on the wall for the battleships. in 1941, the battles of Tarento and the fight against the Bismarck (both times in which the Brits used the old "Swordfish" torpedo bombers to devastate Axis warships) had already put the idea that the battleship ruled the waves to bed. The Japanese were odd in that while they helped drive that lesson home at Pearl Harbor, they still prepared for the "decisive surface battle" -- one last battleship-to-battleship confrontation for the control of the Pacific. We did our best not to oblige them, and due to the battleship fleet pretty much being sunk at Pearl, had a clean slate to develop new tactics centering on avation.

In a way, that's why Yamato had to die -- she was already on the cusp of being obsolete as soon as she was commissioned in 1941. She was built for a battle that would no longer happen. The Iowa class were built for a different purpose -- their mission was to give gunfire support to land operations and to serve as a floating flak tower for the carriers. The Yamato, on the other hand, was built to engage surface ships in battle.

Edited by Pat Payne
Link to comment
Share on other sites

There's always great debate about this, but I believe Japan had a real chance at winning, in spite of major disadvantages. Had they won Midway, who knows what they might have done, Hawaii and cutting off Australia were next on their 'to do list'. I even think, had they won the Guadalcanal/Solomons campaign, they still might have won.

Japan never realistically intended to conquer America, it was believed they could so bloody U.S. forces, sink so many ships and capture so much island territory that America would buckle under the pressure and sign a peace agreement that would secure the Empire's new conquests.

It's easy to say that would never happen since it didn't, but imagine if at Pearl, or Midway or even Guadalcanal, the last of the U.S. Carriers were sunk? What would have stopped Japan from severing the island chains that supplied Australia? Or prevented either the destruction of Pearl Harbor or even invasion of Hawaii?(thus pushing the USN all the way to San Francisco) There would also be great opportunity to finish the job against Britain, secure Colombo/Ceylon and even Madagascar while the Army swept into India. Then Imperial Japan could at last 'link up' with the Germans in N.Africa and Central Asia. This could have had dire consequences for the Soviet Union too.

For about the first 2 years, an allied victory was far from a sure thing in the Pacific. Damn! I wish there was a really good Pacific War strategy game out there... :angry:

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Hmm, my last post was a bit off topic. Regarding Yamato; Imagine if at Guadalcanal, Adm. Yamamoto had actually USED his TWO Super Battleships, Yamato and Musashi, not to mention Nagato and Mutsu which were no slouchs', instead of just useing the 4 Kongo-class battlecruisers. At this time, Japan was the undisputed master of night combat and with Henderson field on Guadalcanal despertely hanging on, I can't see how Japan wouldn't have dealt a decisive defeat. Even in broad daylight, at this point Japan could still provide air cover (a distant memory by 1944~45) and the U.S. had just one or two carriers in theatre, Henderson couldn't put up enough bombers to sink those 2 monster BB's and 2 hefty BB's...

There's a specific moment, during a Night Battle, where the Battlecruiser Kirishima duelled with BB's South Dakota and Washington, Kirishima fought admirably, but was utterly outgunned by the time Wahington got into the fight. It would have been very different if Yamato and/or Musashi appeared.

But, the much vaunted 'visionary' Adm. Yamamoto was untterly unwilling to risk damaging, let alone losing, one of his precious Battleships, which belies his reputation as the great carrier air power admiral. When push came to shove, he'd send anything and everything against the Americans but not his majestic Battleships, they might get scratched after all. Tactically, during the crucial year of 1942, such timidness cost Japan dearly.

Then look at the futile, nearly pathetic demise of Musashi and Yamato. No air cover in either instance and US was fielding just a 'slight' numerical advantage in everything imagineable.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

While the Iowas spent 90% of their time shooting down planes and escorting carriers, they certainly weren't designed for that.

They were specifically designed to counter the Yamato class, and little more. Speed was increased over the South Dakota class mainly to keep up with the faster Japanese BB's, as Japan had been rebuilding many of their BB's and had already surpassed the North Carolinas in speed and tied the South Dakotas.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

While the Iowas spent 90% of their time shooting down planes and escorting carriers, they certainly weren't designed for that.

They were specifically designed to counter the Yamato class, and little more.  Speed was increased over the South Dakota class mainly to keep up with the faster Japanese BB's, as Japan had been rebuilding many of their BB's and had already surpassed the North Carolinas in speed and tied the South Dakotas.

347805[/snapback]

You might be right about that, David. But it always stuck in my mind that they were designed with the carrier-support role in mind as well. I may have just overplayed HOW much. ;)

Link to comment
Share on other sites

While the Iowas spent 90% of their time shooting down planes and escorting carriers, they certainly weren't designed for that.

They were specifically designed to counter the Yamato class, and little more.   Speed was increased over the South Dakota class mainly to keep up with the faster Japanese BB's, as Japan had been rebuilding many of their BB's and had already surpassed the North Carolinas in speed and tied the South Dakotas.

347805[/snapback]

You might be right about that, David. But it always stuck in my mind that they were designed with the carrier-support role in mind as well. I may have just overplayed HOW much. ;)

347807[/snapback]

They were designed to slug it out with BBs. It was thought that the Yamato's had weapons similar to the S. Dakota's (16/45), so the Iowa's were built with armour to resist shells up to 16/45. But once they were commisioned, they ended up being carrier escorts.

As for the Imperial Japanese winning. I would disagree. Japan was too stretched for troops to take and hold Hawaii. The USN subs would strangle the supply route. Even if the ENTIRE navy was sunk at Pearl Harbour, by 1944 US industry would still have churned out a fleet which will dwarf whatever the IJN has. And of course there was still the A-Bomb by 1945.

If Yamato had been there instead of Kirishima she might have taken down the South Dakota. But at under 10,000 yards, even her armour will not be immune to the 16/45 on Washington. So the IJN might have lost her too.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

As for the Imperial Japanese winning. I would disagree. Japan was too stretched for troops to take and hold Hawaii. The USN subs would strangle the supply route. Even if the ENTIRE navy was sunk at Pearl Harbour, by 1944 US industry would still have churned out a fleet which will dwarf whatever the IJN has. And of course there was still the A-Bomb by 1945.

347811[/snapback]

That's why I qualified it all to heck and gone in my original post. IF the Japanese could protect the lengthy supply lines to Hawaii, they may have won a local battle in taking Hawaii, and therefore perhaps lengthening the war by perhaps anywhere between six months and two years. Roosevelt may also have been forced by Congress to drop the "Germany First" strategy in such a scenario, as there would be little but what was left of the US Pacific Fleet between the Japanese and the mainland. However, they would still have, as you mentioned, no chance of winning in an invasion of the mainland United States. It would have been like the German invasion of Russia (without the brutal winter and even more brutal Stalin), where we could draw on a massive amount of people, aready armed in many cases who could be formed up to repel the Japanese.

At no point in my post did I say that Imperial Japan had a chance of winning the war. Even Yamamoto realized before Pearl Harbor that the war would ultimately be lost when he told the High Command (IIRC) that he would be able to cut loose for six months or a year at most. After that, he said, there were no guarantees. (What is popularly and erroneously described as his boast to dictate terms in the White House was actually a warning to the Japanese leadership that they could not win the war without doing that, at a massive cost to Japan's military. Also, Yamamoto never said the quote about awakening a sleeping giant and filling him with a terrible resolve.)

What Japan hoped to do was influence US policy -- Pearl Harbor was, ultimately, the result of a massive trade dispute. Japan needed raw materials to continue expanding in Asia, and their major supplier of feul oil, aircraft aluminum and other supplies was the United States. We cut off those supplies in protest of Japan's actions in China (primarily the Nanjing Massacre and the later invasion of French-held Indochina) an action which drove Japan to desperation. Japan was given an ultimatum: Evacuate Indochina and China, and sales would resume. Prime Minister/War Minister Hideki Tojo wanted his cake and the ability to eat it as well. The plan behind Pearl Harbor, then, was twofold -- First, it was to give the Japanese time to launch a blitzkreig across Asia and take as much area into the "East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" before America and Britain regrouped and tried to retaliate (in their wildest dreams, the Japanese hoped that the sheer amount of territory they had conquered would give us and the Brits pause). Second, the Japanese misread us -- at that time, the United States military was very small, and not yet war ready (We would not enter into planned offensive operations until the late spring of 1942, by which time men and materiel were finally coming into good numbers and good quality -- our first operations in Europe wouldn't happen 'till November, 1942.). The Japanese perhaps hoped that a good swift kick would get the isolationists and the Willkie/Lindbergh/America First (no war, no how) crowd to ramp up their actions in Congress and elsewhere and make a negotiated settlement with at least Japan, giving them a free hand in Asia. Obviously, it was as successful as Crassus' invasion of Parthia.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

That was never the mission, and may have been beyond the ken of the Japanese at that point in the war. Remember, you have to look at Pearl in the wider context of the war. On December 7, not only did the Japanese attack Pearl Harbor (to knock out the US Pacific Fleet in the hopes of, if not bringing them to a negotiated settlement, at least giving the Japanese six months to a year of a free hand to consolidate their position), but they also attacked the Philippines, Wake Island, Singapore, Burma, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and were on their way to attacking Indonesia. The attack on Pearl was just one front in a wider breakout offensive by Japan on and around December 7.

Agreed, that was never the mission. But their own strategic concept was to knock out the Americans enough to truly establish their own sphere of influence. The places they wanted included Australia, all of SE Asia. Basically to supplant the Brits and the Amis as the master of Asia. However, they ignored some strategic reality. They really should have taken Hawaii. Once that's gone, the next closest naval base is SF or SD. Because the Amis had Hawaii, it enabled them to strategically place their forces. What is Hawaii but a gigantic unsinkable aircraft carrier.

And, speaking as an American, I'm darn glad they didn't try to take Pearl on December 7. It would have been an unmitigated disaster for us, as we were already reeling from the near destruction of great swathes of the fleet, and a similar destruction among the Army Air Forces installations. Although the troops in Hawaii would have put up a credible fight, and though there were still fighting ships available, the example of the Philippines seems to indicate that the Japanese, given a good assault force and enough security of their supply lines (which was the real probelm for them -- Hawaii is a good distance from Japan and the main Japanese supply bases and areas of operation, meaning a perilous sea journey for supplies that would have had to have gone to the operation, particularly if they had to pass by Midway, still in US hands) could have caused serious problems, and perhaps even defeated the garrison in Hawaii. Breifly put, On December 7, 1941, we were flat footed. In fact, in the actual event, about the only thing that saved Pearl Harbor NAS from a third wave and an even worse pasting (the third wave was to center on the fuel depots and repair yards) was that Adm. Nagumo had no idea where the US carrier force was (they had been sent out on manuvers days before December 7) and feared they were looking for him. 

Yep, you're right about this as well. The Japanese forces were quite stretched at the time, certainly the force that hit Pearl couldn't have taken it. But they should've coordinated the strike with the IJA. It's a long way to go, but if they take Hawaii, you cut the U.S. off from the rest of Asia. SF or SD to Australia or Phillipines, well, that's a long way to go. At that point, the Japanese army was at its peak. I think it would've been possible to take Hawaii, it would've been bloody, and it would've postponed the assault on SE Asia by at least six months. But at the end of this, the IJN would've had a dominant position in the Pacific. In the long run, they still lose. Consider what was thrown at them by 1944. They could not hope to match that force. Yamamoto was absolutely right about sleeping giant. U.S. had enough to fight a two front war, and then do R&D for a nuke. Japan was doomed from the start.

The Japanese were odd in that while they helped drive that lesson home at Pearl Harbor, they still prepared for the "decisive surface battle" -- one last battleship-to-battleship confrontation for the control of the Pacific. We did our best not to oblige them, and due to the battleship fleet pretty much being sunk at Pearl, had a clean slate to develop new tactics centering on avation.

Actually, there was one last, and very one sided night engagement at Leyte, where the ghosts of Pearl Harbor raped the Japanese surface forces that was coming up from the south. Olendorf's old BBs and cruiser task force practically destroyed the entire Japanese force.

The Iowa class were built for a different purpose -- their mission was to give gunfire support to land operations and to serve as a floating flak tower for the carriers. The Yamato, on the other hand, was built to engage surface ships in battle.

True enough, but the Iowa would still have beaten up on the Yamato in a mano e' mano fight.

To Major Jonathan:

I think you and I differ on the Japanese ability to win the war. 1941 was the turning point of WWII. Everyone knew the U.S. would get in on the act eventually, but it was a matter of timing. That's what WWII turned on. The later the U.S. got in, the better the chances for the Axis. i.e. If the Germans took England, they own Europe. Everyone else had been committed and bloodied by the end of 1941. The Japanese had limited strategic aim, it was their one failing. Everyone else had zero illusions about peace treaties except the Japanese. I think WWII was a war of ideology more than territory. There would be winners, and the losers would be dead. Part of it may be the Japanese's ingrained sense of superiority, and you know, they weren't wrong from the track record up till December 7th. They figured they were so tough that if they hit someone hard enough, the opposition would just fold. After all, there were still elements of the Japanese military that were talking about a conditional peace after Hiroshima. That's just stupid.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Join the conversation

You can post now and register later. If you have an account, sign in now to post with your account.

Guest
Reply to this topic...

×   Pasted as rich text.   Paste as plain text instead

  Only 75 emoji are allowed.

×   Your link has been automatically embedded.   Display as a link instead

×   Your previous content has been restored.   Clear editor

×   You cannot paste images directly. Upload or insert images from URL.

×
×
  • Create New...